We empirically examine stock price index data for eight developed and ten emerging markets from 1970 to 1997. There were nine stock market crises over our sample period, three each in the developed stock markets, the Asian stock markets and the Latin American stock markets. We find important differences in the characteristics of stock market crises between the developed and emerging stock markets. While each developed market crisis has been less severe than the previous one, both in terms of the extent of price decline and the duration of the crises, this is not so for the emerging stock markets. For emerging markets stock crises, prices tend to fall rapidly and steeply, but take longer to recover, in about three years on average. For both developed and emerging markets, prices fall for at least three years subsequent to recovery from a crisis. All the crises we study are associated with contagion---i.e., most individual markets in a region are in crisis when the regional market is also in crisis. Finally, for U.S. investors with long investment horizons (six months or more), international stocks continue to provide diversification benefits even during times of market crises.
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The recent episodes of large price declines in Asian stock markets have once again drawn attention to the consequences of international stock market crises. What are the magnitudes of stock price declines during crises? Is there evidence of contagion during these crises---i.e., do several markets experience a crisis simultaneously? Finally, international investments are beneficial to U.S. investors if correlations between U.S. and non-U.S. stock markets are low. How do stock market correlations change during a crisis, and is this dependent on how long investors hold their stocks for?
There is relatively little research on international stock market crises, whereas there is an extensive literature on international currency crises and the U.S. stock market crash of 1987. Roll Asian crisis of 1997 (see Box one). We study stock price changes before and after these episodes to document price increases prior to crashes and the price recovery following crashes. We document the extent of contagion during crises and examine whether the correlation between stock market indices changes during episodes of significant price declines.
2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section summarizes the literature on currency and U.S. stock market crises. The second section describes the data, and the construction of regional indices. We proceed to identify stock market crises for our sample period, and characterize the behavior of stock market indices surrounding the crises episodes.
Finally, we analyze the extent of contagion and the change in correlations between markets during these crises. To supplement the technical analysis, we provide in Box one a chronology of economic and political events surrounding the stock market crises identified in the paper.
Literature survey
The crises literature has mostly focused on currency crises and the U.S. stock market crash of 1987, and examined issues related to the causes of crises, price changes (including, among other economic variables, stock returns) surrounding the crises, international market linkages, contagion, and changes in benefits to international diversification. In our paper, we examine these same issues for 18 international stock markets from 1970 to 1997.
The U.S. stock market crash of October 1987 inspired several studies. Black (1988), Fama (1989) and Roll (1989) seek to explain the crash in terms of shifts in fundamental factors, such as downwards revisions in expectations about global economic activity, or higher equilibrium required returns. In contrast, Seyhun (1990) concludes, based on the behavior of corporate insiders, that investor overreaction was an important part of the Crash. His evidence showed that, while the Crash was a surprise to insiders, they bought stocks in record numbers immediately after the Crash, especially those stocks which had declined the most, and these stocks had large 3 positive returns in 1988. 1 Norden and Schaller (1996) use regime-switching regressions to conclude that the degree of prior market overvaluations explain subsequent U.S. stock market crashes for the period 1926-89.
The U.S. stock market crash inspired several studies on the international links between stock markets. In early literature, Solnik (1974) showed that international investments are beneficial for U.S. investors since correlations between U.S. and non-U.S. markets are low. Bennett and Kelleher (1988) find that the transmission of stock price volatility between markets was greater than normal during the Crash, and that periods of high daily volatility are associated with high correlations between markets. Neumark, Tinsley and Tosini (1991) show that correlations between stock market prices of different countries increase during times of extreme volatility and become small or close to zero during more normal periods and suggest that transactions costs may explain this pattern of asymmetric correlations. In a recent paper, Lin and Ito (1994) find a significant increase in the hourly return correlation between the S&P 500 index the Nikkei 225 from the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) during the 1987 crash period. 2 In related research, Aderhold, Cumming, and Harwood (1988) conclude that direct international linkages cannot account for the worldwide decline in equity markets in October 1987. Cross-border selling of equity was a factor only in Tokyo and stock trading outside the 1 Other papers have examined whether the October Crash was a speculative bubble---i.e., the crash occurred following a period when investors persistently overvalued the market. Shiller (1987) provides survey evidence that, before the Crash, almost 72 per cent of individual investors and 84 per cent of institutional investors thought the market was overvalued. Hardouvelis (1988) finds evidence that excess stock returns prior to the Crash were greater than normal in the U.S., Japan and Great Britain., and he attributes the abnormally high excess return to a bubble premium. 2 One puzzling aspect of the 1987 crash was the behavior of the S&P 500 index of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). For example, the index exceeded the corresponding futures price (negative basis), displayed unusually strong and persistent serial correlation, and unusually low variance. Harris (1987) shows that nonsynchronous trading in the stocks making up the index cannot account for the large (absolute) value of the basis. Kleidon (1992) argues that stale limit buy orders can account for the behavior of the S&P 500 index. For example, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) show that countries with weak fundamentals are more susceptible to contagion. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) find that, after controlling for the effects of economic and political variables, the probability of a speculative attack on a currency increases eight percent when a crisis occurs elsewhere in the world. 
Data and regional index construction
We use monthly dollar-denominated returns on stock indices, supplied by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), for eight developed countries (Switzerland and the G7 countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K. and U.S.A.) from January 1970 till December 1997.
We also use dollar-denominated returns on stock indices for ten emerging market countries: six Asian emerging markets (Indonesia, S. Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand) and four Latin American emerging markets (Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico). This data is available from January 1976 till December 1997, and was obtained from the Global returns series of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). 4 The country returns are combined into three regional dollar-denominated index returns for the Developed markets, Asia and Latin America. The monthly regional return is constructed by equally weighting the monthly returns of each country in the region. 5 The three regional index levels at time t are obtained by cumulating the corresponding monthly regional returns up to time t.
A History of Regional Stock Price Declines
To identify periods of significant price declines in the history of the regions, we define a variable called CMAX t which is the ratio of the regional index level at time t to the maximum regional index level for the period up to time t. 6 Figure one All three regions have experienced episodes of large price declines. However, as may be expected, price declines in the emerging markets are typically larger in magnitude than price declines in developed markets. For example, in the developed markets, there were three episodes where the regional price index declined more than 20% relative to the previous historical 4 The MSCI and IFC data sets have been widely used in previous work. The methodological notes from both indices provide detailed descriptions of the data. To obtain the longest possible sample, we have used the Global (instead of Investible) returns series from the IFC. The sample period for Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan begins in January 1985 and that for Indonesia begins in January 1990. 5 Alternative weighting schemes may include market capitalization (which is not available for the full time series in our sample), nominal and purchasing power GDP. We could also have equally weighted the returns on an annual, rather than monthly basis. 6 The variable CMAX t is widely used by equity market practitioners. For example, it has been used in "MSCI Perspective", a monthly publication of Morgan Stanley providing index and index-constituent data, and in the 6 maximum level, but there were six such episodes for Asian markets and four such episodes for Latin American markets. In addition, there was only one instance when price declines in developed markets exceeded 35 per cent, with the largest price decline being 39.9 percent in September 1974. In contrast, there were six such episodes for emerging Latin American and
Asian markets---for example, Asian stock indices declined almost 68 per cent relative to their historical maximum by December 1997.
We define a stock market crash as an event when the regional price index declines, relative to the historical maximum, more than 20 per cent for the developed markets, and more than 35
per cent for the emerging markets. 7 The beginning of the crash is the month when the price index falls below this threshold level. The beginning of a crisis is the month when the index reached its historical maximum prior to the month when the crash is triggered. The date of trough is the month when the price index reaches its minimum level during the crisis. The date of recovery is the first month when the index reaches the pre-crash maximum level after the crash is triggered.
To avoid counting the same crisis twice, additional triggers occurring within a crisis are considered part of the existing crisis, instead of being an indicator of a new crisis.
To illustrate our definition, consider the Latin American crisis of 1981. In July 1981, the Latin American regional index fell 36.14% below its historical maximum level. Since the decline exceeds the trigger of 35%, we identify this episode as a crash. The beginning of the crisis was June 1980, the month that the Latin American regional index achieved its historical maximum.
The crisis ended 65 months later, in November 1985, when the Latin American index recovered to Barra-Forbes page of Forbes magazine. We define CMAX t in nominal dollar terms. In future analysis, we may also define CMAX t in real dollar or real local currency terms. 7 For the developed markets and Asia, the trigger price represents a level about two standard deviations below the mean value of CMAX t . For Latin American markets, the trigger price is about one standard deviation below the Of the remaining three crises, the 1987 crises in developed and Latin American countries were associated with the U.S. stock market crash and the Asian crisis of 1990 was a result of several simultaneous political and economic shocks.
Table one provides further information on regional crises. The "Months to trough" column shows the number of months over which the regional index reached the trough. The "Months to recovery" column shows the number of months taken for the regional index to recover. The duration of a crisis is the number of months taken to fall to the trough and then recover to the previous peak. mean value of CMAX t , reflecting the higher volatility of these markets. For the sake of consistency, we wanted to 8
There have been three crises each in the Latin American and Asian stock markets since 1970. In contrast to the developed markets, the severity of the crises shows no signs of declining.
In fact, the emerging market crises have most in common with the first (and most severe) developed markets crisis of 1973. The emerging market crises tend to be quick and steep, but with long periods of recovery and crises duration. Even then, recovery occurs in less than three years. The maximum price decline in a crisis was around 40 per cent for four of the six crises, and exceeded 60 per cent in the other two.
In all nine crises, stock price crashes have been preceded by significant price increases, with the median value of the annualized returns for the three years prior to the crises being almost 49 per cent. This is consistent with the results of Roll (1988) , who found substantial price increases in many international stock markets in the nine months prior to the October 1987 stock crash. Our results show that the magnitude of pre-crisis price increases is typically larger for emerging markets than for developed markets. Further, for emerging markets, the average annual price increase for the three years before the crises exceeds the maximum price decline in the crises-a feature that may be consistent with a "bubble" (see, for example, Allen and Gale (1998)). Interestingly, this "bubbles"-type feature is not present in the recent Asian crisis, where the annual pre-crisis price increase was only a third of the maximum price decline in the crisis.
A surprising result is that, in all nine crises, prices have fallen following recovery, with the median value of the annualized returns for the three years after the crisis being about negative nine per cent.
have one trigger level for all emerging markets.
Lead-lag Relationship Between Stock Price Declines and Advances
We saw, in table one, that stock prices rise significantly prior to regional crises. To further examine the behavior of stock prices prior to episodes of significant price declines, we define a variable called MINC t , defined as the ratio of the minimum index level for the three year period prior to time t to the index level at time t. These observations suggest that stock market crises may be systematically preceded by episodes of significant price increases. To examine this idea more formally, we calculate the correlation between CMAX t+lag and MINC t for various values of lag ranging from -60 months to + 60 months. When the value of lag is negative, the correlation indicates whether price increases lead the subsequent price decline. For example, suppose lag is -60 months (i.e., 60 months prior to t), and t is January 1990, and the correlation between CMAX t-60 and MINC t is positive. This means that if, five years ago in January 1985, the index level was close to its historical high, then in January 1990, the price is likely to be close to its previous minimum. In this case, aboveaverage index levels are likely to be followed by below-average index levels---i.e., prices are mean-reverting. If the correlation is negative, then high values of index levels are likely to be followed by still higher index levels---i.e., prices are positively auto-correlated. values increase further, the correlation reaches a peak and then starts declining again. The lag value at which the correlation peaks is the period of time after which the probability of recovery is the strongest. This lag value, too, varies by region, being largest for Latin America, followed by Asia, and the developed region. These results indicate that, consistent with our earlier findings, the period of recovery is longer for emerging markets than it is for developed markets.
Individual Market Crises and Contagion
Is a regional crisis typically associated with an individual market crisis? 8 In figure four, we show, corresponding to each regional crisis, the individual markets in the region that are also in crisis. Each band illustrates the duration of an individual market crisis, with the beginning and end of a band dating the beginning and end of the crisis. It is clear that, for all episodes of regional crises, half or more of the individual markets were affected. An interesting aspect of figure four is that there were several instances when individual markets were in crisis, but this did not spill over into a regional crisis. However, since 1990, there is an increasing tendency for markets in Asia and Latin America to move together.
In table two, we examine the behavior of individual country stock prices when the region is in crisis. All regional crises are associated with contagion, in the sense that most countries in the region participate in the stock market decline. Even though contagion within a region is endemic, the evidence does not indicate significant contagion across regions. This leads us to examine how the diversification benefits of U.S. investors are affected during a crisis.
Diversification Benefits of U.S. Investors
In this section, we examine the crises from the point of view of an U.S. investor. U.S.
investors are often advised to hold both U.S. stocks and non-U.S. stocks in their portfolio. Since U.S. and non-U.S. markets do not move one-for-one (they are imperfectly correlated), such a portfolio can be less risky, without sacrificing returns, relative to a domestic stock portfolio.
However, a common belief is that U.S. and emerging markets have high correlations when the U.S. market is falling, so that "when you need diversification, you don't get it, and you get it when you don't need it." (Graja, 1998) .
To address this issue, we examine the correlation between the U.S. markets and the remaining developed markets (excluding Japan), as well as Asia and Latin America. We first sort the monthly index returns for all three regions by the value of the U.S. returns, and then, for each region, we distribute the observations into the lowest and highest twenty five percent of U.S. More important, the correlation for the lowest returns is zero for Asia. Again, the result is true whether we sort the returns by the U.S. returns or the non-U.S. returns.
These results are generalized in figure five, where we show correlations for holding period returns between zero and 30 months. For each holding period, we compute the corresponding holding period returns for the U.S. returns. For the lowest 25% returns, figure five shows the pair-wise correlations between the U.S. and non-U.S. markets. The correlations between U.S., other developed markets and emerging markets (both Asian and Latin America) decrease with the holding period, eventually becoming zero for a sufficiently long holding period. Our results move together, but make no attempt to explain why they do so.
demonstrate that emerging market investments reduces the risk of U.S. investors' stock portfolio, provided the investor holds the stocks for a sufficiently long time.
CONCLUSION
We empirically examine stock price index data for 8 developed and 10 emerging markets from 1970 to 1997. We identify episodes of significant price declines ("crashes") and discuss stock price behavior surrounding these episodes. We examine stock price changes before and after these episodes to document price increases prior to crashes and the price recovery following crashes. We document the extent of contagion during crises and examine whether the correlation between stock market indices changes during episodes of significant price declines.
We identify nine stock market crashes over our sample period: three in the developed markets, when price index levels declined more than 20 per cent relative to their historical maximum, and six in emerging markets, when index levels fell more than 35 per cent relative to their historical maximum. Crashes tend to be quick and steep, but prices do recover, usually in three years or less. Emerging markets tend to have larger price declines and longer recovery times than developed markets. The process of crash and recovery together typically lasts about 31 months. However, for the three years subsequent to the recovery, stock prices tend to decline again, although not with the same severity as during the crash.
Prices tend to rise prior to a crash, and the magnitude of price increases is also larger for emerging markets. For short horizons, prices are autocorrelated, whereas for longer horizons, there is evidence of mean reversion. This means that, over longer horizons, prices do recover from a crash. However, the recovery time is longer for emerging markets and, within emerging markets, longer for Asia than Latin America.
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There is strong evidence of contagion within regions, in that most countries in a region participate in a crisis. Those stock markets affected by the crisis are about equally affected, both in terms of the severity of the price decline, and the duration of the crisis. The crisis perpetuates rapidly from one market in a region to the next, with consecutive markets being affected in the same month or within one month of one another.
We confirm the often-held belief that correlations between U.S. and emerging markets tend to become higher in times of market decline. However, this is only true for investors who hold stocks for short periods of time---for less than one year, in the case of Asian stocks. For longer-horizon investors the correlations remain very small even when markets fall. For these investors, emerging market stocks continue to provide important diversification benefits even during periods of significant market declines.
Box 1 A History of Stock Market Crises
The Developed Markets Recovery Japan recovered in only two months, and Canada and the U.K. took 19 months or less. But France and Italy took more than three years to recover.
3. The crisis of 1987, involving all developed markets in our sample other than Japan, originated in the U.S., when prices at the New York Stock Exchange fell by one third over five trading days in October, triggered by high trade deficits and proposed takeovers related legislation. The major developed stock markets had all reached their peaks between April and September of 1987. The crisis spread to all of them, except Japan, in October 1987 (except Switzerland, where the market crashed in November). Recovery The recovery took between 11 months (Switzerland) and two years (Italy).
Box 2 Summary of analysis and results
• Empirical analysis of stock price index data for eight developed and ten emerging markets from 1970 to 1997.
• Nine stock market crashes over our sample period, three in each region.
• Each developed market crisis has been less severe than the previous one, both in terms of the magnitude of price decline and the duration of the crisis.
• For emerging markets, prices fall rapidly and steeply, and take long to recover, usually in about three years or less.
• For all markets, prices decline for at least three years subsequent to the recovery from the crisis.
• There is evidence of contagion---most markets in a region participate in the crisis.
• For U.S. investors with long horizons (one year or more), international investing is beneficial even during periods of market declines.
Table 1: A Chronology of Regional Crises
A crash is triggered when, relative to the previous maximum, the regional stock price index declined more than 20 percent in the developed markets or more than 35 per cent in the emerging markets. The beginning of a regional crises is the date when the index reached its maximum just prior to the trigger time. The end of a crisis is the date when the index reached the pre-trigger maximum level the first instance after the trigger time. We exclude triggers occurring within six months of the initial trigger time. A crash is triggered when, relative to the historical maximum, a country's stock price index declined more than 20 percent in the developed markets or more than 35 per cent in the emerging markets. The beginning of an individual market crises is the date when the index reached its maximum just prior to the trigger time. The end of a crisis is the date when the index reached the pre-trigger maximum level the first instance after the trigger time. We exclude triggers occurring within six months of the initial trigger time. 
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